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Asset Price Movement and Derivatives:
Implications for Risk Based Supervision
and Effective Monetary Policy
Biodun Adedipe, Ph.D *
I.

Introduction

T

he consideration of asset price movements and monetary policy has
attracted a lot of attention in the last few decades, as asset prices moved
upwards significantly and there arose the general perception that there
are bubbles in those prices. The argument has revolved around the role that
monetary policy can play in this whether it can be used to prick the bubble before
it is due for natural burst, or it can be designed and implemented in such manner
as to prevent bubbles to grow in the first place.

One of the major ironies of the modem economy is the boom-burst cycle and the
fear attendant to a booming economy. The fear is not about the boom itself, but of
the burst that will inevitably follow the boom. Usually, the pervasive prosperity
experienced during a boom grows in intensity, and as it does, so does the fear of
an impending crash. Many market participants usually take advantage of the
boom to the fullest, by embarking on carefree consumption spree and rapid new
capital formation that is funded by the bubble, thus fueling inflationary pressures
and creating worries for the monetary authorities.
Several studies have been conducted to try and track asset price movements, most
0
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of them broadly inferring that these movements are random and can hardly be
predicted with certainty. It is this attribute of asset prices that make the burst point
in the business cycle to be difficult to predict and, thus, limit the ability to make
adequate preparations to contain the subsequent upheaval. This is why it has been
argued that the best way to handle the fear of an impending crisis is to preclude it
by pricking the bubble before it goes into natural burst.
The soundness of financial institutions and stability of the financial system has
been established as the joint responsibility of the regulators and operators, being
a departure from the old thinking that it was basically the responsibility of the
regulators. There are times though that the responsibility falls squarely on the
regulators, even when it is the unreasonable profit-taking and rent-seeking
activities of the operators that created the problem. The recent global financial
crisis (which snowballed into economic crisis) was, at some point, blamed on
regulatory lapses, especially in the argument that the non-regulation of
derivatives contributed significantly to the crisis. There was finger-pointing and
recriminations, which were unnecessary, as the regulators were actually as guilty
as the operators. A quick summary of it would be to state that the operators were
careless in risk management and they were not particularly transparent in their
dealings, while the regulators were laid back.
Financial assets have over the years become more synthetic, as derivatives
emerged on the scene with securitization and very complex designs that looked
perfect for breaking the risk implications of straightforward transactions into
digestible smaller chunks. This gave market participants such confidence that
made it look like, at last, modem finance has found a solution to the problem of
the economic cycle.
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In this new found confidence, credit grantors became a little careless because
they did not need to retain the risk of the assets they were carrying, and this
optimism spread all across borders and financial jurisdictions, and in the process
creating unprecedented wealth. This outcome, on its own, further made most
market participants to think that the system was working well and needed no
rethink.
Ordinarily, the lessons of past market crashes should have been an effective
caution as the contemporary market evolved. But the quick recovery after the
downturn of the early 2000s was regarded as indicative of a permanent answer to
the phenomenon ofboom-burst cycle. The thought was 'finance has come ofage.
The kernel of risk-based supervts1on is that the type of intervention that
regulatory authorities will make is based on the nature of risks a financial
institution is taking (whether directly or inadvertently) and its capability to
handle such risks, including the pricing of such risks. The supervisory authority
will then give more attention to the institution that is weak in risk management,
either in terms of its enterprise-wide risk management framework (ERM) or its
deployment. Appropriate pricing of risk is also important because more risky
transactions should normally be more expensive to the customer of a financial
institution. When the risk-price nexus is taken into account, an institution that has
a strong ERM and capacity to implement it will then attract less attention from the
supervisors.
As it is, monetary policy cannot effectively pre-empt asset price bubbles, but
when it is designed to track asset price movements and also to correctly interpret
them, it could recommend prompt actions that can be taken to minimize the
adverse effects of a sudden bubble bust.
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Derivatives and Risk-Based Supervision (RBS)

Financial assets have in the last two and half decades become more synthetic,
with the introduction of financial derivatives into the markets. They were first
introduced in the equities and foreign exchange markets and, subsequently, in the
credit markets with the securitization of corporate debts of varying degrees of
health/toxicity.
Derivatives came in very complex designs that looked perfect for dealing with the
risk implications of the underlying huge transactions by breaking them into
digestible smaller chunks. The bankers that devised them were also deemed
extremely brilliant, having created vehicles that would enable the world finance
mega projects and deals without the worry of the risk crystallizing! It was
considered a brilliant way to separate between risk and reward, beating the
primordial link that had served over the centuries as a check to the voracious risk
appetite of business managers who want to produce 'mind-boggling' numbers! It
was thought that whenever risks crystallize, the spread of these instruments over
market participants will ensure that individual losses are minimized. This of
course, assumes that individual choices on the volume of derivatives to invest in
would not create self-inflicted excessive risk.
The reengineering of banking supervision and standards through the Basel I and
II accords, created the impression (perhaps wrongly so) that when adequate
capital is complemented with sophisticated risk management techniques,
financial systems should remain safe and stable. The assumptions ignored the
fact that greed, across the market spectrum, can easily make all market
participants careless and bring the entire system to a ruin. This is popularly
referred to as the 'herd instinct'.
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In this new found confidence, credit grantors became a little careless because they
did not need to retain on their books the risk of the assets they were carrying, as
much as they could easily create Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and sell these
tradable instruments to willing and excited investors. It is quite logical for lenders
to chum the volumes and leave the risk of collection to someone else, whilst
enjoying the support of rating agencies.
The optimism spread across all borders and financial jurisdictions, and the
process lowered the cost ofcapital as well as created unprecedented wealth. This
notion is generally interpreted as having the unusual combination of higher yield
and less risk! This brings to mind the remarks of Janet Tavakoli, President of
Tavakoli Structured Finance about credit derivatives they are an anomaly!
Tavakoli describes credit derivatives "surgical strikes against portfolio credit
risks."
Ordinarily, the lessons ofpast market crashes should have been an effective guide
and caution. The recovery of the late 1980s, after the crash of 1987 that most
people blamed on the equity-futures market has shown how resilient an ordered
market (with necessary restrictions) can be. That market has grown in leaps and
bounds till date. In 2007, the Chicago equity futures traded US$45 trillion of
contracts on the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 Index, against underlying assets
(equities) of $10 trillion.
Unfortunately, the lessons were not carried over to the other segments of the
derivatives market, since things seemed to be working well there. Indeed, the
quick recovery after the downturn of the early 2000s in the USA was attributed,
among other factors, to the existence of Credit Default Swaps (CDS), which were
regarded as an effective solution to the risks that can cause market upheavals and
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lead to boom-busting. This was the kind of concern that Timothy F. Geithner,
President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (now US Treasury
Secretary), expressed about credit derivatives in April 2007, stating that:
" .... when innovation, such as we are now seeing in credit derivatives, takes place
in a period of generally favorable economic and financial conditions, we are
necessarily left with more uncertainty about how exposures will evolve and
markets will function in less favorable circumstances. The past several years of
exceptionally rapid growth in credit derivatives and the larger role played by nonbank financial institutions, including hedge funds, has occurred in a context of
very low realized credit losses, low expectations of future default risk, a high
degree of confidence in the financial strength of the major banks and investment
banks, relatively strong and significantly more stable economic growth, less
concern about the level and volatility in future inflation, and low expected
volatility in many asset prices. Even if a substantial part of these changes prove
durable, we know less about how these markets will function in conditions of
stress, and the most sophisticated tools available for measuring potential losses
have less to offer than they will with the benefit ofexperience with adversity."
Now, the kernel of risk-based supervision (RBS) is how regulatory authorities
may intervene when an intervention is called for. The nature of this intervention
should reflect the type/depth of risks a financial institution is taking (whether
directly or inadvertently) and its capability to handle such risks, including the
pricing of such risks.

In transiting from Basel I to Basel II Accord, it has been argued that having large
capital or having adequate capital is not a sufficient condition for soundness in
banking business. This is underscored by bank failures during the years since
Basel I Accord became operational. There is also the moral hazard question. In so
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far as a bank's doors are open for business, the depositors and other bank
stakeholders will assume that the bank must be healthy for the regulatory
authorities to allow it to remain open. They reason that:
1.

Having a valid CBN license means that the bank has a clean bill of health,
which must have been granted it after the CBN conducted bank
examination.

2.

CBN is the lender of/ast resort who will be there to bail out such bank in
the event of trouble.

3.

The Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) provides deposit
insurance that assumes that most depositors, of insured banks will get
their money back in the event ofliquidation.

Unfortunately, this attitude weakens market discipline that ordinarily should be
exercised by banks' customers and depositors, and puts back on bank regulators
and supervisors the burden of safety and soundness of the financial system.
The deficiencies of risk-insensitive capital adequacy tool as an assurance ofbank
safety and the growing importance of market discipline places good emphasis on
risk-based bank supervision. This is premised on the dictum that in the world of
risk "One size does not fit all." As such, the aim of RBS is to create incentives
among banks for:
1.

More responsible management and risk control.

2.

Effective hedging ofrisk, which includes right pricing ofrisk.

3.

Greater efficiency.

Accordingly, banks will need capital that is appropriate to their risks and controls.
and by implication, banks that focus on low risk activities are likely to require less
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capital. In the same vein, banks that adopt advanced risk control systems will
require less capital. It then means that two banks can have the same value-at-risk
(VAR) but have different capital requirements because of the relative strength of
their risk control systems.

In an RBS environment, banks would be free to set their individual limits to
reflect the level of their control systems and to manage their individual risks,
which should make them have well-managed portfolios. The critical assumption
then is that bank management would be guided into right behaviour rather than
driven by the desires for 'numbers', i.e. the bottom-line which is profit.
The Basel II Accord aims to make the regulatory capital of a bank more equal to
its economic risk capital, as depicted in diagram 1. The stronger a bank is in risk
management, the lower the economic capital it requires, and vice versa.

Figure 1

High

Regulatory Capital

Capital
Requirement

Economic Capital

Low
Weak

Risk Management

Strong
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The supervisory authority will then give more attention to the institution that is weak in
risk management, either in terms of poorly designed Enterprise-wide Risk Management
framework (ERM) or poor implementation of ERM. As such, an institution that bas a
strong ERM and capacity to implement it will attract less attention from the supervisors
and vice versa.
Regulatory review under RBS encourages quick intervention, which gives more freedom
but confers higher responsibility on bank management and as well empowers regulators
to supervise more flexibly and effectively. In essence, more diverse and complex risks
require the regulators to give more attention to risks that have wider implications for the
entire bankin[: system, so as to be able to pre-empt systemic distress. Risks that are

isolated to particular institutions and have no contagion or systemic implications will
attract less attention from the regulators.
The essence of RBS then is not to prevent banks from taking risks considered
appropriate, but to ensure that bank management understand and control the types and
levels of risks their institutions take. Thus, the sophistication of the risk management
systems will vary across banks depending on the level of risk present and the size and/or
complexity of the institution itself. This means that the regulatory authorities will assi[:n
[:reater resources to areas of higher or increasing risk, both within an individual

institution and among banks in the general. In addition, examinations will be performed
based on the risks and the conclusions reached on the institution's risk profile and
condition. The regulator will follow up only on the areas ofconcern.
The worry today is how come, with this higher level of sophistication in risk
management, the recent financial crisis and meltdown could not be correctly predicted
and prevented. It seemed everybody was excited about the prosperity attendant to the
creativity ofbankers and the opportunity it afforded them to buy corporate debt.
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Monetary Policy to the Rescue?

Over the years, there have been robust debates over the role that monetary policy can and
should play in an environment of rapid asset price increases. There are arguments [Qr_ and

a~ainst this expectation, and some empirical studies have been conducted. While some
suggest that monetary policy should be proactive to pre-empt asset price bubbles, some
argue that it should rather stand ready to deal with a meltdown when it occurs, as asset
price movements cannot be easily predicted.
However, where the thought is for monetary policy to be proactive and intervene to prick
the bubble before it gets to a natural bust, the challenge has remained how to figure out
the best time to intervene. This of course, would require monetary authorities to track
asset price movements and correctly interpret them and, thus, be able to determine when
to stick in the 'pin'.
IV.

Stylized Facts

According to the Contact Group on Asset Prices (2002), asset markets affect economies
more today than at any other time historically because:
i. Financial liberalization has deepened the stock and property markets and, thus,
expanded participation.
ii. Economic inte~ration and ~lobalization have reduced the ability of individual
countries to absorb market shocks without cross-border collaboration.
Interdependence and wider (and more complex) international trade have made
nations to depend more on each other and react to any developments in the
financial jurisdictions oftheir trade partners.
iii. Credit cycles are larger and credit growth has become more pro-cyclical. This is
the observed phenomenon of rapid expansion of credit during recovery and
credit crunch during recession.
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1v. Price stability has not co-varied with financial stability, especially considering
periods of financial instability during which the advanced economies enjoyed
relative price stability.
v. Crashes in property markets have tended to have more severe consequences than
crashes in equities and other markets, largely because of the important role of
properties as collaterals. Bernanke and Gertner (2001) found from historical data
8 per cent dip in GDP with crisis in the property market as against 4 per cent
decline when there was crisis in equities and other markets.
vi. Deregulation comes along with opportunities for wealth creation and growth that
accompany asset price bubbles and poorly timed monetary policy response can
worsen the situation rather than ameliorate or temper the consequences.
vii. Unsound incentive structures to the financial sector can lead to excessive risktaking, by both the individual credit officers and the institutions they work for.
viii. Growth and internationalization of asset markets have increased the need for
transparency and information disclosure.
ix. Because asset markets are forward looking. strong equity prices seem to correlate
with high price-earning ratios, while high property prices co-vary with property
rents.
x . "It is often taken for granted that a monetary regime that produces aggregate
price stability is likely to limit the risk of excessive asset price fluctuation and to
promote stability in the financial system."
These facts provide grounds to explore whether monetary policy should intervene in
asset markets or not, although there is no strong indication that asset markets have
important potential for causing financial instability. The challenge still remains how to
establish a perfect relationship between asset prices and the fundamentals, such that
bubbles can be measured precisely, price movements predicted correctly and, thus,
determine the point at which to prick the bubble without mistake.
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V.
Monetary Policy not to Intervene
The argument that monetary policy should not intervene is based on the summary
provided by Saxton (2003) on the characteristics ofasset price movements as follows:
i. Historically, there have been many 'booms and busts' in asset prices and stock
market crashes, irrespective ofthe exchange rate regime fixed or flexible.
ii. 'Boom and bust' episodes are more frequent in stock markets than in property
market.
iii. It is rare for 'boom and bust' to occur at the same time in the stock market and
property market. As such, the 2008 crisis is unusual and uncommon and thus,
difficult to figure out and resolve quickly.
1v. More frequently, real estate bubbles are localized and, therefore, not a
macroeconomic issue. Again, the 2008 crisis has proved otherwise the bubbles
were transnational and intercontinental!
v. Equity prices are more volatile than property prices.
v1. There is empirical evidence that consumption increases with asset price bubbles,
while there is no strong evidence of increase in investments. The 2008 crisis has
both elements to compound the situation.
vii. Empirical evidence finds no strong, reliable relationship between changes in
monetary policy and equity prices. This explains why the tinkering with reserve
requirements by the Central Bank of Nigeria during the fourth quarter of 2008
had no visible impact on equity prices in the Nigerian stock market.
viii.In addition, there is no evidence of strong relationship between changes in equity
prices and changes in general prices.
There are two important implications ofthe above stylized facts and empirical evidence:
a. Monetary policy should not respond to any of the disturbances mentioned above
because it is a macroeconomic tool.
_b. Since equity prices are not reliably related to changes in monetary policy, equity
prices will not serve as a useful policy indicator in an inflation targeting regime.
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Furthermore, it was argued that monetary policy should focus on what it can do
especially that:
a. The causal effects from stock prices to aggregate demand are relatively weak and
unreliable.
b. Circumstances mandating a monetary policy response to asset price movements
are relatively unusual,and indeed, rare events.
c. In practice, asset price misalignments and bubbles are difficult to identify and
control.
Now, rather than leave things to the markets to work out by themselves, there is the
advocacy for monetary authorities to move quickly to nip asset market bubbles before
they mature and bust naturally, the latter having more dire consequences for the financial
system and the economy. The argument rests on the following facts:
A. The stock market is laa:er and more widespread.
b. The equity market plays a laa:er role in the monetary transmission process.
c. Asset price bubbles can foist significant financial imbalances on the financial
system.
d. Asset price volatility and financial imbalances will increasinr:lv proliferate in
low inflation and stable economic environments.
e. Asset prices and asset price inflation are important components of general prices
and general inflation.
f.

Asset price bubbles can be identified and controlled. Indeed, the bubble
component in asset prices can be identified.

The importance of this role for monetary policy depends largely on the ability to identify
a bubble through early warning signals, such as those suggested by the researchers of the
Bank for International Settlements and the European Central Bank, namely:
"When credit-to-income ratio and the real aggregate asset prices
simultaneously deviate from their trends by 4 percentage points and 40
per cent respectively."
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When these were applied to historical data, they successfully predicted 55 per cent of
financial crisis. Relying on them would, however, have triggered a false alarm about an
impending financial crisis 3 per cent of the time.

VI.

Inferences

From these stylized facts and the strength ofthe arguments as well as empirical evidence,
the obvious inference is for monetary policy not to seek intervention in equity and
property markets to address rapid price movements. The weight of evidence supports the
conventional view, which is that monetary policy should focus on its traditional role, and
only seek to respond to asset prices in a defined, and limited circumstances. That will be
when asset prices obviously might affect a~regate demand or price stability. Monetary
policy should also respond to rapid asset price movements when asset price deflation
becomes a threat tofinancial system stability. which relates to the central bank's role as a
lender oflast resort.
It is widely believed that the sort of intervention desired of monetary policy is actually
more amenable to the tax and financial system regulatory authorities. That is, the tax
authorities should reconsider the tax deductibility of interest payments and regulatory
authorities more vigilant during periods of asset price bubbles.
Schwartz (2002) suggested the adoption of "capital requirements that increase with the
growth of credit extensions collateralized by assets whose prices have escalated." This
will be an effective check on financial institutions becoming reckless in granting credit
to support speculation during periods ofrapid asset price movements.

It is, however, to be noted that not all bubbles are dangerous, Trichet (2005) argued that
booms become costly when associated with leverage. What needs to be watched
carefully then is the credit-GDP ratio, corporate debt vis-a-vis aggregate credit, and
proportion of credit that goes into the sector experiencing bubbles.
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For Nigeria, especially with the recent meltdown in the stock market and fear of an
impending similar meltdown in the property market, the concern should be more with
what portion of the investments that drove the boom was financed by bank loans. The
more siwzi[icant bank loans are, the more worried the Central Bank ofNigeria should be
and the more logical it would be for monetary policy intervention to be considered to
stabilize the financial system.
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study found that housing busts are more costly

than equity market busts. Empirical facts confirm that housing bust causes output losses
amounting to 8 per cent of GDP and this is twice that of equity bust. By implications,
monetary authorities should worry more about housing bubbles than stock market
bubbles.
Bernanke and Gertner (2001) concluded in an update of their previous studies and
empirical evidence that inflation-targeting central banks should not respond to asset
price movements, except on occasions that the movements affect inflation forecast. This
is the 'standard model'.
There is no better way to put all the arguments together than to quote from a speech by
Bernanke (2002):
"The correct interpretation of the 1920s, then, is not the popular one -that the stock market got overvalued, crashed and caused a great
depression. The true story is that monetary policy tried overzealously to
stop the rise in stock prices. But the main effect of the tight monetary
policy, as Benjamin Strong had predicted, was to slow the economy -both domestically and, through the workings of the gold standard,
abroad. The slowing economy, together with rising interest rates, was in
turn a major factor in precipitating the stock market crash."
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Conclusion

There is no doubt that an emerging economy like Nigeria, that is also reforming, will
produce a lot of investment opportunities across different sectors, as they open up and
internationalize. The attraction of new investments, especially to the stock and property
markets, will naturally start a boom.
The review ofliterature shows that labeling a boom as 'bubble' is the critical thing in the
consideration of whether the central bank should act or not when there arises rapid asset
price movements. The two schools ofthought standard and 'bubble-busting' proponents
have interesting arguments, but the weight of evidence favours the standard model.
The final take, as at today, is that for an inflation-targeting central bank, it should stick to
its primary function economic growth and financial system stability. It is dangerous to
seek to 'prick' the bubble in asset prices when the bubble is difficult to identify, let alone
measure and determine the appropriate policy response. The greatest danger in
intervention is that by tightening monetary policy, inadvertently the central bank will
slow down the economy and possibly help it into recession. This was what happened in
the l 920's, with the benefitofhindsight and historical analysis.
Also, there is a lot of lessons to be learnt from the 2008 crisis. Conceptually, financial
derivatives are an effective instrument for risk diversification and dispersal, but they tum
into time bombs when left unregulated. If and when Nigerian financial institutions begin
to create and trade credit derivatives especially, the apex bank should ensure that an
effective regulatory framework is in place and each of such product undergo an approval
process, the same way the bank used to do for all special products ofbanks in the 1990s.
As useful as minimum capital requirement and risk-insensitive regulatory capital are to

force banks to maintain capital levels that are commensurate to the nature of their
business (high gearing), the Central Bank should begin to focus more on economic
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capital. More capital should be required of banks that are more risky, while the review
(through stress tests) should take place at more frequent intervals than hitherto. The latter
will make us preclude the kind of'big bang' ofJuly 2004.
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